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Abstract
Epidemic surveillance is a fundamental part of public health 
practice. Addressing under-ascertainment of cases is rele-
vant in most surveillance systems, especially in pandemics of 
new diseases with a large spectrum of clinical presentations 
as it may influence  timings of policy implementation and 
public risk perception. From this perspective, this article 
presents and discusses early evidence on under-ascertain-
ment of COVID-19 and its motifs, options for surveillance, 
and reflections around their importance to tailor public 
health measures. In the case of COVID-19, systematically ad-
dressing and estimating under-ascertainment of cases is es-
sential to tailor timely public health measures, and commu-
nicating these findings is of the utmost importance for poli-
cy making and public perception.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by S. Karger AG, Basel 
on behalf of NOVA National School of Public Health
Vigilância Epidemiológica do COVID-19: 
considerações sobre incerteza e sub-deteção
Palavras Chave
Vigilância epidemiológica COVID-19 · Subindetificação ·  
Subdeteção · Sensibilidade sistemas de vigilância 
epidemiológica
A vigilância epidemiológica é uma parte fundamental da 
prática de saúde pública. Considerar e avaliar a sub-de-
teção de casos é relevante na maioria dos sistemas de 
vigilância, especialmente em pandemias de novas doen-
ças com um amplo espectro de apresentações clínicas, 
porque pode influenciar os momentos e de decisões em 
políticas de saúde e a perceção de risco da população. 
Este artigo apresenta e discute evidência inicial sobre a 
sub-deteção do COVID-19 e os seus motivos, opções de 
vigilância e reflexões sobre sua importância para informar 
medidas de saúde pública. No caso do COVID-19, abordar 
e estimar sistematicamente a su-deteção de casos é es-
sencial para adequar as medidas de saúde pública, e co-
municar essas achados é de extrema importância para a 
formulação de políticas.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by S. Karger AG, Basel 
on behalf of NOVA National School of Public Health
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Introduction
Epidemic surveillance is a critical component of public 
health practice. It gives us pictures of reality, informs pol-
icy and decision making, gauges health service demand, 
and feeds forecasts and models.
However, surveillance is never perfect and diseases 
that present with a high proportion of mild, pauci-symp-
tomatic, or subclinical cases can be hard to detect in most 
indicator-based surveillance systems and become harder 
to contain [1]. Surveillance pyramids can take different 
formats and proportions of undetected cases (often mild 
or asymptomatic). The scientific community is making 
efforts to address uncertainty about where to draw the 
lines separating different clinical manifestations and be-
tween ascertained and unascertained cases. 
Covid-19 surveillance is challenging because mild and 
subclinical cases may not seek health services, cases are 
advised to avoid health care unless necessary, and testing 
capacity may be limited (Fig. 1).
In the case of COVID-19, addressing and estimating 
under-ascertainment of cases is essential to tailor public 
health measures. Communicating these findings is of the 
utmost importance for evidence-based policy making 
and community engagement.
Imported Cases, Uncertainty, and Under-
Ascertainment
In Europe in late February there was a fast rise in the 
number of confirmed cases in Italy, and the probability 
of importation of cases of COVID-19 may have been 
high in Europe until Italy stopped movement from 
Northern Italy and later from the rest of the country. The 
rapid rise and characteristics of confirmed cases in 
Northern Italy indicated an earlier important undetected 
community transmission, especially among mild cases. 
As such, it is possible that in late February many cases 
from Northern Italy (and possibly from other European 
areas) were exported all over Europe. These cases may 
have given rise to mostly undetected transmission chains 
that remained active in the next months, justifying early 
enhanced surveillance and control measures that were 
taken by different governments to buy time for prepared-
ness.
The generalized under-detection of imported cases has 
been confirmed in a study in Singapore, which estimated 
that the overall ability to detect imported cases was 38% 
(95% HPDI: 22–64%) of Singapore’s capacity. In high-
quality surveillance locations (based on the Global Health 
Security index) it was 40% (95% HPDI: 22–67%) [2].
In line with these findings, a report by Imperial College 
London estimated that 2/3 of Covid-19 cases exported 
from mainland China remained undetected worldwide 
(until February 17), resulting in several undetected trans-
mission chains. They found countries in Europe had rela-
tively low sensitivity for imported cases [3]. A relevant 
part of the fast growth in detected cases in Italy and other 
countries could be related to undetected transmission 
chains from early introduced cases and accumulated a 
large pool of infected cases.
It is likely that a high proportion of imported cases all 
around Europe have not been found, and isolation, con-
tact tracing, and quarantine could not be applied consid-
ering the WHO suspect case definition (as of February 27, 
2020).
Although many countries advised travellers returning 
from certain areas to report (call a health line or medical 
doctor) if they had symptoms, it is possible that people 
with mild symptoms may not have followed this advice. 
Consequently, many cases that might have followed from 
this would not be tested because they lacked a clear epi-
demiological link (Fig. 2).
In fact, several articles suggest a major under-ascer-
tainment/under-reporting of total cases in different 
countries. 
One study modelled the real dimension of the epidem-
ic in Italy from international case exportations and esti-
mated a real size of 3,971 cases (95% CI: 2,907–5,297), 
compared to a case count of 1,128 on February 29, 2020, 
suggesting an under-ascertainment of 72% (61–79%) of 
cases. In sensitivity analyses, the range of variation was 
from 1,552 to 4,533 cases (implying the identification of 
27–75% of cases) [4].
Publicly available epidemiological data for Hubei, 
from January 11 to February 10, 2020, revealed a signifi-
cant decline in the fatality rate with time. As testing be-
comes widespread, the detection of milder cases that 
would not seek health care in the early stages will result 
in a lower case fatality rate [5].
Another study used data from air travel and cases im-
ported from Iran in other Middle Eastern countries and 
estimated that there were 16,533 (95% CI: 5,925–35,538) 
COVID-19 cases in Iran as of February 25, which meant 
only 0.6% of all cases had been reported [6].
Other models used reported infection within China, in 
conjunction with mobility data, a networked dynamic 
metapopulation model, and Bayesian inference, and esti-
mated that 86% of all infections were undocumented 
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(95% CI: 82–90%) prior to 23 January, 2020, travel re-
strictions and that undocumented infections were the in-
fection source for 79% of documented cases [7].
Adding to this we should consider specific surveillance 
system delays from infection and symptom onset to re-
porting. We should ask ourselves whether different choic-
es at different timings would be made at an individual and 
policy level if we only looked to the confirmed cases. 
Modelled estimations of total infected and counts of sus-
pect/possible cases that were not laboratory confirmed 
should be considered and communicated together with 
uncertainty in model assumptions (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 1. Hypothetical examples of surveillance pyramids for COVID-19 with two of many possible under-ascer-
tainment lines.
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of undetected transmission chains started in undetected imported cases (left) 
and detected and controlled transmission chains started in a detected imported case (right) if only the WHO 
suspect case definition from September 27, 2019, is considered (as of March 20, 2020).
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Surveillance Strategies Used to Ascertain Cases and 
Inform Planning
Some countries initiated earlier and wider testing than 
others [8]. Some started earlier to test admitted cases of 
bilateral pneumonia without other aetiology (allowing 
for earlier consideration of community transmission), 
and some tested contacts even if asymptomatic. Criteria 
for testing in earlier stages was variable and resulted in 
very different testing rates [8]. The different testing strat-
egies and consequent different levels of under-ascertain-
ment may account for some of the differences in the fatal-
ity rate found in different countries in Europe such as 
Italy and Germany (9 and 0.2%, respectively) [9], though 
we should also consider the impact of overload of the 
health systems, characteristics of the specific surveillance 
system, and population demographics and behaviour. 
There are various options for surveillance to improve case 
detection or make estimations (Table 1).
Limited capacity for testing may play a role in testing 
strategies, forcing some countries to prioritize testing, but 
it makes discussion and research around under-ascer-
tainment even more relevant in those contexts. Under-
ascertainment in surveillance should make us consider an 
under-ascertained need for specific early measures (for 
example of social distancing) but also, in later stages, that 
a much larger part of the population could be immune 
and social distancing strategies could change, which also 
raises the importance of serologic surveys in those cir-
cumstances to confirm these estimates.
One document of the European Centre of Disease 
Control (ECDC) [10] reports that “the detection of CO-
VID-19 cases and/or deaths outside of known chains of 
transmission is a strong signal that social distancing mea-
sures should be considered.” However, with restrictive 
testing strategies, these signals may be missed. The docu-
ment states that “the early, decisive, rapid, coordinated 
and comprehensive implementation of closures and 
quarantines is likely to be more effective in slowing the 
spread of the virus than a delayed implementation” and 
that decisions “will very rarely be purely evidence-based” 
as social and political considerations will also need to be 
taken into account. Evidence is always incomplete, espe-
cially in new pandemics.
Different Triggers, Different Measures, Different 
Outcomes
There is evidence of the effectiveness of public health 
measures such as travel bans, movement restrictions, and 
social distancing. A study used a SEIR (susceptible-ex-
posed-infectious-removed) model to estimate epidemio-
logical parameters before the implementation of mea-
sures in Wuhan. If these measures had been initiated 1, 2, 
or 3 weeks earlier in China, cases could have been reduced 
by 66, 86, and 95%, respectively, together with a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of affected areas [11].
Another study reports that the effective reproduction 
number in Wuhan fell from 2.35 (95% CI: 1.15–4.77) 1 
week before the introduction of restrictions on January 
23, 2020, to 1.55 (0.41–2.39) 1 week later and calculated 
that in sites with Wuhan-like transmission potential in 
early January, when there were only 4 cases introduced, 
there is more than a 50% chance of the infection settling 
in this population [12].
Other simulation [13] suggests that to control most 
outbreaks, for R0 (number of cases directly generated by 
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Fig. 3. A hypothetical graph showing re-
ported cases (assumed case evolution in 
Italy by day) and estimated number of in-
fections considering 5× and 10× higher in-
cidence [4–7].
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one case in a population where all individuals are suscep-
tible to infection) of 3–5, more than 70% of contacts had 
to be identified. In most scenarios, highly effective case 
identification and isolation of contacts could control a 
new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months. However, 
importantly, the probability of control decreases with de-
lays in the identification of cases and contacts, increased 
time from onset of symptoms to isolation, fewer cases 
identified, and increased transmission before symptoms. 
The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Track-
er [14] describes variation in government responses and 
explores whether rising stringency of response affects the 
rate of infection. They calculate a stringency-risk ratio but 
warn that recorded cases partly depend on how much 
testing is done, which is likely to co-vary with the strin-
gency of the government’s response. Regular updated re-
sults will be available for anyone.
A recent study by the Imperial College COVID-19 Re-
sponse Team shows that in the UK and US context, sup-
pression requires a combination of social distancing of 
the entire population, home isolation of cases, and house-
hold quarantine of their family members, that may need 
school and university closures and reports other strate-
gies that may involve social distancing of those > 70 years 
old. However, the study predicts that transmission will 
quickly rebound if interventions are relaxed and suggests 
that intermittent social distancing – triggered by trends 
in disease surveillance – may allow interventions to be 
relaxed temporarily [15]. This strategy needs robust sur-
veillance systems that allow for acceptable sensitivity to 
timely decide on interventions. We believe these triggers 
must consider evidence and debate around surveillance 
system sensitivity and under-ascertainment. As suggest-
ed by another Imperial College Report [16], this would be 
relevant to produce early evidence when exiting the CO-
VID-19 social distancing policy after achieving contain-
ment.
Due to different surveillance systems, different mea-
sures at different timings, different levels of stringency 
[14], and different demographic and social dynamics, the 
outcomes within Europe may be heterogeneous. Unde-
tected introduction of imported cases and many mild un-
detected cases making up those transmission chains may 
warrant early measures. By looking at the death epidemic 
curves (likely less sensitive to variations in surveillance 
system sensitivity) of different countries we see differenc-
es that can be related to earlier detection and implemen-
tation of measures (Fig.  4). Notably, South Korea has 
managed to keep new deaths by COVID-19 low despite 
being in a relatively advanced stage of the epidemic and 
Table 1. Surveillance strategies to identify and estimate community cases and inform planning (beyond the WHO suspect case defini-
tion from February 27, 2020, as of March 20, 2020)
Surveillance and estimation 
strategies
Description
Sentinel surveillance (for 
example in primary care)
At regular intervals, a representative batch of specimens are sent to a reference/referral laboratory for 
confirmation and further characterization
Syndromic surveillance –
collection of syndromic data 
through health lines and 
mobile apps
Some countries have different platforms where people or clinicians report symptoms and situations 
and are forwarded as adequate; clinicians may have platforms to report suspect/possible/probable 
cases (even if testing is not available); this allows for syndromic surveillance, registration of cases as 
well as directing suspect cases for testing
Estimate imported cases 
through modelling
Estimate imported cases from travel information and the number of imported cases in countries with 
higher detection rates and other methods
Detect imported cases Quarantine of cases coming from affected areas; entrance screening (low effectiveness); 
communication campaigns for engagement to call health lines at first symptoms (even if mild)
Estimate undetected cases Estimations based on models: using international case exportations, mobility data, SEIR models 
(dynamic transmission), other methods considering number of deaths, case fatality rates, and others
Sample testing Probabilistic sampling in a determined population to estimate infection
Serologic surveys Probabilistic sampling in a determined population to estimate exposure
Mass testing Testing of a large proportion of the population; may be difficult considering testing capacity but may 
be done in smaller settings
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is one of the countries with a higher testing rate [8]. An 
early study [17] estimated the transmission potential of 
COVID-19 in the country and suggested early sustained 
disease transmission in the region which contributed to 
the rapid early implementation of social distancing mea-
sures to contain the outbreak [14].
Considering uncertainty and under-ascertainment is 
critical for decision when 500 cases could possibly mean 
5,000. Delay from exposure and infection to reporting 
must also be considered. 
There is at this stage high uncertainty about the behav-
iour of the disease in Europe, the effectiveness of mea-
sures in different contexts, and the timing for their imple-
mentation. Often, measures should be implemented ear-
ly with imperfect scientific knowledge. On the other 
hand, estimated total infection numbers can be important 
to justify measures for public opinion, engage them in 
preventive action, and reinforce recommendations for 
those who are tested positive as well as to inform deci-
sions on exiting social distancing policies.
More robust models will be produced soon, but mod-
els make assumptions based on surveillance data and oth-
er sources with different levels of uncertainty. Under-as-
certainment should be considered, and the best available 
information and data should be included and pursued by 
improving surveillance strategies to reduce or better esti-
mate under-ascertainment. With more epidemiological 
evidence, namely greater certainty in relation to the pro-
portion of asymptomatic infections and their risk of 
transmission, different surveillance system sensitivity, ef-
fective R in different contexts and effectiveness of con-
tainment measures and with the results of the First Few 
X Cases FFX investigation proposed by WHO [18] for 
COVID-19 models will better take into account under-
ascertainment in different countries. Understanding the 
extent of transmission in different regions can help policy 
makers tailor their response. Acknowledging that “we 
can’t fight a pandemic blindfolded,” on March 16, 2020, 
the WHO urged countries to test.
Conclusion
Under-ascertainment may be of relevance for COV-
ID-19 policy. There is uncertainty on this subject and in 
the studies mentioned in this article and presented reflec-
tions. However, it is the role of the scientific community 
in public health and epidemiology not only to communi-
cate what is certain and based in robust established sci-
ence, but also of what is uncertain, when it may be of rel-
evance for decision making and can be further researched, 
discussed, and shared. As in most infectious disease sur-
veillance, under-ascertainment can be a relevant piece of 
the puzzle for COVID-19 science, policy making, and 
public opinion and should be systematically addressed 
and communicated.
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